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In September of 2013 the Supreme Court of Japan issued two judgments 
dealing with the constitutionality of statutory schemes that discriminated 
based on legitimacy. The first case resulted in the Court finding the 
provision unconstitutional, a rare occurrence in Japan. The second case 
found no constitutional problem to exist. This article will compare and 
contrast the two decisions while explaining the family law context in 
which they arose. It also offers an explanation of how the Court could 
arrive at two seemingly contradictory conclusions at almost the same time 
in its history.  
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 100 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE JUDICIAL 
POWER IN JAPAN ............................................................................ 101 
III. THE INHERITANCE CASE .......................................................... 103 
A. The Case within the Context of Japanese Family Law ..... 103 
B. The Facts, Issues and Rationale ........................................ 105 
ii. The Facts ....................................................................... 105 
iii. The Issues ................................................................. 106 
2014] LEGITIMACY BASED DISCRIMINATION         100 
 
iv. The Rationale ................................................................ 106 
C. Standards of Review ......................................................... 110 
D. The Inheritance Case: Another Glimmer of Hope? .......... 115 
E. Implementation ................................................................. 116 
i. The Significance ........................................................... 116 
ii. The Dilemma ................................................................ 118 
iii. The Solution .............................................................. 119 
IV. THE REGISTRATION CASE ........................................................ 120 
A. Background ....................................................................... 120 
i. The Family Register and Family Law .......................... 121 
ii. The Facts of the Registration Case ............................... 129 
B. The Case............................................................................ 130 
C. So Much for Social Change .............................................. 133 
V. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION ................................................. 134 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In September 2013, Japan’s Supreme Court issued two separate 
judgments relating to the constitutionality of statutory and regulatory 
provisions that discriminated based on legitimacy. In both cases, the 
opinion of the Court was unanimous. The first, decided on September 4, 
found unconstitutional Article 900(iv) of the Japanese Civil Code, which 
granted to children born out of wedlock a statutory share of inheritance 
only half that accorded legitimate children. 1  Such action violated the 
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† All English translations of Japanese-language materials referenced in this article 
are by the author unless otherwise noted.   
1 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand Bench) Sept. 4, 2013, 2012 (ku) no. 984 & 
985, 67 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1320, available at, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/ text/2013.09. 04-2012.-Ku-
.No..984.and.985-195441.html (English translation) [hereinafter Inheritance 
Case]. Prior to its amendment in December 2013 the provision at issue read as 
follows:  
If there are two or more heirs of the same rank, their shares in inheritance shall be 
determined by the following items: . . .  
(iv) if there are two or more children, lineal ascendants, or siblings, the share in 
the inheritance of each shall be divided equally; provided that the share in 
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constitutional guarantee of equal treatment under the law and was thus 
void with respect to the estate at issue.2 This case will be referred to in this 
article as the “Inheritance Case.”  
The second case, decided on September 26, involved an equal 
protection challenge to Article 49(2)(i) of the Family Register Act, which 
requires parents reporting a birth to indicate whether or not the child was 
born in wedlock.3 In this case the court found no constitutional violation. 
It will be referred to as the “Registration Case.” 
Both cases arose under Article 14(1) of the Constitution of Japan, 
which reads as follows: “All of the people are equal under the law and 
there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations 
because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.”4 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE JUDICIAL 
POWER IN JAPAN 
Under Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution, “[t]he Supreme 
Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the 
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.”5 This has 
                                                                                                               
 
 
inheritance of an child out of wedlock shall be one half of the share in inheritance 
of a child in wedlock, and the share in inheritance of a sibling who shares only 
one parent with the decedent shall be one half of the share in inheritance of a 
sibling who shares both parents. 
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] 1896, art. 900, para. iv, 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2058&vm=04&re=02Son
y&new=1 (unofficial English translation) (Part IV and V). 
2 Inheritance Case, supra note 1. 
3 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (1st Petty Bench) Sept. 26, 2013, 2012 (Gyō tsu) no. 
399, 67 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1384, available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/ text/ 2013.09.26-2012.-Gyo-Tsu-
.No..399.html (English translation) [hereinafter Registration Case]. Article 49(1) 
of the Family Register Act requires the report of a birth to be filed with the 
registration authorities within 14 days of birth (or three months if the child is born 
abroad). KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 49, para. 1. 
Paragraph (2) of the same article contains a list of items of information that need 
to be included in the report, including (i) gender and “whether the child is born in 
or out of wedlock.” Id. para. 2.  
4 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14, para. 1. In addition to the 
equal treatment mandate contained in paragraph (1), paragraphs (2) and (3) 
prohibit peerages and any type of hereditary honor. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ 
[KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14. 
5 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81. 
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been interpreted as being an “ancillary” power of constitutional review 
(futaiteki iken shinsaken), meaning that there must be a justiciable case or 
controversy before the Court in order for it to make a constitutional 
determination, similar to the US System.6 Such a requirement necessitates 
that inferior courts also have the power to rule on constitutional issues, 
even though the Constitution itself only clearly vests the power in the 
Supreme Court.7  
Fifteen justices sit on the Court,8 which is actually four distinct 
panels, or benches. 9  There are three Petty Benches comprised of five 
justices each.10 These dispose of most of the Court’s docket, which is 
voluminous, since in theory the Supreme Court has the final word on 
matters of interpretation involving all areas of Japanese law, not just the 
Constitution.  
In addition to the three Petty Benches, all fifteen justices 
sometimes sit en banc as the Grand Bench. Under the Court Act, only the 
Grand Bench may issue a ruling of unconstitutionality or overrule a prior 
Grand Bench interpretation.11 By contrast, a Petty Bench may resolve the 
matter if it involves a constitutional ruling consistent with the prior Grand 
Bench decision.12 
This brings us to an important difference between the two cases; 
the Inheritance Case was decided by the Grand Bench. Article 900(iv) of 
the Civil Code had previously been found not to violate Article 14(1) of 
                                                 
 
 
6 See, e.g., SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN – A CONTEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS 135-40. (2011).  
7 Id. at 120-21.  
8 See SAIBANSHOHŌ [Courts Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 5, para. 1, 3 (stating 
the Supreme Court is comprised of a Chief Justice and fourteen Justices of the 
Supreme Court). 
9 SAIKŌSAIBANSHO SAIBANJIMU SHORI KISOKU [Sup. Ct. Admin. Rules], Sup. Ct. 
Rule No. 6 of 1947, art. 1-2, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/kisokusyu/sonota_kisoku/sonota_kisoku_06/index.html.  
10 Id. art. 2.  
11 See SAIBANSHOHŌ [Court Act], Act No. 59 of 1947, art. 10. (providing that “a 
petty bench may not give a judicial decision” in cases in which involve a 
determination on the constitutionality of law, cases in which a “law, order, rule or 
disposition is to be decided as unconstitutional,” and cases in which an 
interpretation or application of the Constitution is contrary to a “decision 
previously rendered by the Supreme Court”). 
12 According to Supreme Court rules, a case may also be referred from a Petty 
Bench to the Grand Bench in the event of a split among the Petty Bench panel or 
when otherwise deemed appropriate. Supreme Court Trial Rules, art. 9.   
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the Constitution in a 1995 Grand Bench decision (referred to in this article 
as the “1995 Decision”).13 This view was affirmed in subsequent Petty 
Bench decisions as well.14 Thus, even before the decision was announced, 
the mere news that the Inheritance Case was reviewed by the Grand Bench 
caused speculation that the 1995 Decision would be overturned;15 only a 
Petty Bench decision would have been required to reaffirm the 
constitutionality of Article 900(iv).16  
Conversely, the Registration Case was heard by a Petty Bench. 
The decision did not find a statute or government act to be 
unconstitutional or conflict with a prior Grand Bench precedent on the 
issue.17   
III. THE INHERITANCE CASE 
A. The Case within the Context of Japanese Family Law  
Since its establishment in 1947, Japan’s Supreme Court has only 
held a provision in a statute to be unconstitutional on nine occasions,18 
most recently the Inheritance Case.19 The reluctance of the Supreme Court 
to invalidate legislation on constitutional grounds is one reason why some 
scholars refer to the Court as being highly “conservative” or describe 
                                                 
 
 
13 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand Bench) July 5, 1995, 1991 (ku) no. 143, 49 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1789, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1995.07.05-1991-Ku-No.143-
155301.html (English translation) [hereinafter 1995 Decision].    
14 See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (2nd Petty Bench) Sept. 30, 2009, 1314 
HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]123 [hereinafter 2009 Decision]. 
15 See, e.g., Top Court May Annul Inheritance Disparity, THE JAPAN TIMES (Jul. 
10, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/07/10/national/top-court-may-
annul-inheritance-disparity/#.UzI2oK1dU8x. 
16 Sup. Ct. Admin. Rules, supra note 9, art. 9. 
17 Registration Case, supra note 3. 
18 See David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in 
Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545, 1547 (2009) (noting that in 2009 (before the 
Inheritance Case) the Supreme Court of Japan ruled eight statutes unconstitutional 
since the Court’s creation in 1947). 
19 Inheritance Case, supra note 1. The Supreme Court has also held the 
application of statutes and regulations – i.e., government acts – to be 
unconstitutional on about a dozen other occasions. See Law, supra note 18, at 
1547-48 (describing laws and rules found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
of Japan). 
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judicial constitutional review as having “failed” in Japan.20 This article 
will neither seek to endorse nor challenge these characterizations. 
 Suffice it to say, however, the Inheritance Case is significant. Not 
only is it one of the Court’s few unconstitutionality rulings, but it is the 
first instance of the Court invalidating a provision of the Japanese Civil 
Code. Containing the rules of property, contract, tort, family law and 
inheritance, the Civil Code is one of the most basic canons of Japanese 
law. Much of it also predates the current Constitution by half a century, 
although parts, particularly the sections dealing with family law and 
inheritance, were substantially rewritten during the American occupation, 
as is discussed in more detail below.  
For this reason alone, the Inheritance Case may prove particularly 
important. In addition to the discriminatory provisions of Article 900(iv), 
the Civil Code contains a number of other provisions that would on their 
face seem suspect under Article 14(1), including: different age thresholds 
for marriage based upon gender (Article 731),21 a requirement prohibiting 
remarriage within six months of divorce applicable only to women 
(Article 733),22  a statutory presumption that a child born to a woman 
within 300 days of her divorce is her ex-husband’s (Article 772),23 and the 
default vesting in mothers of sole parental authority over children born out 
of wedlock (Article 819(4)). 24  Some of these provisions would seem 
constitutionally problematic, not only under Article 14(1) but also under 
Article 24. Article 24 of the Constitution requires that all laws pertaining 
to marriage and the family be “enacted from the standpoint of individual 
                                                 
 
 
20 See, e.g., David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1425 (2011) (evaluating the historical, cultural, political, and 
institutional explanations for the failure of judicial review in Japan); Shigenori 
Matsui, Why Is the Japanese Supreme Court so Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1375 (2011) (examining why the Japanese Supreme Court has developed 
such a conservative constitutional jurisprudence). 
21 MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] 1896, art. 731 (“A man who has attained 18 years of 
age, and a woman who has attained 16 years of age may enter into marriage.”), 
available at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?re=02&co=01&ia=03&x=29
&y=9&al[]=C&ky=civil+code&page=27. 
22 Id. art. 733. 
23 See id. art. 772 (stating a presumption that the husband is the father of a child 
conceived during marriage, and that a child born within 300 days after dissolution 
of the marriage is “presumed to have been conceived during marriage.”). 
24 See id. art. 819, para. 4. (“A father shall only exercise parental authority with 
regard to a child of his that he has affiliated if both parents agree that he shall 
have parental authority.”). 
105 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 9 
 
dignity and the essential equality of the sexes”.25 This language is even 
reiterated in Article 2 of the Civil Code. 26  Nonetheless, these 
discriminatory provisions have been upheld by prior Supreme Court 
precedents finding them not to violate the constitution.27 
Therefore, the Inheritance Case might signal the tantalizing 
possibility of the Court more actively challenging the other inequalities 
and anachronisms that remain enshrined in the Civil Code, 
notwithstanding decades of change in Japanese society. As we shall see, 
however, the Registration Case suggests otherwise.  
B. The Facts, Issues and Rationale 
i. The Facts 
The facts of the Inheritance Case are simple enough. A decedent - 
“P” - died in July 2001, leaving as heirs his legitimate children (the 
Appellees) and children born out of wedlock (the Appellants). 28  The 
Appellees had petitioned the trial court for a declaratory judgment 
confirming Appellants’ statutory share of P’s estate. 29  Finding no 
constitutional problems, the trial court ordered that the estate be 
distributed in accordance with Article 900(iv), that is, with Appellants 
receiving only half the shares of Appellees.30 Appeals eventually resulted 
in the case being heard by  the Supreme Court.  
 
                                                 
 
 
25 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 24. 
26 See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] 1896, art. 2 (“This Code must be construed in 
accordance with honoring the dignity of individuals and the essential equality of 
both sexes.”), available at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=Civi
l+Code&x=0&y=0&ia=03&ky=&page=4 (Part I, II and III) [hereinafter MINPŌ 
Parts I-III]. 
27 For example in a brief decision in 1995, the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme 
Court reconfirmed the constitutionality of the Article 733 prohibition on women 
remarrying within six months of divorce on the grounds that the discriminatory 
treatment had a rational basis: the policy goal of minimizing confusion over the 
paternity of children born shortly after the divorce. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
(3rd Petty Bench) Dec. 5, 1995, 177 ATSUMARI-MIN [SHŪMIN] 243, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/search/jhsp0030?hanreiid= 76107&hanreiKbn=02.  
28 Inheritance Case, supra note 1, para. 1. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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ii. The Issues 
In order to arrive at its conclusion that the Civil Code provision 
violated the constitution, the Grand Bench had to deal with two major 
issues. The first was justifying the reversal of its own holding in the 1995 
Decision.31 Eighteen years is not a long time in jurisprudential terms, so 
the Court had to articulate a reason why what had recently been 
constitutional no longer was. The second was implementation.32 By the 
time the Court issued its ruling over a decade had passed since P’s death. 
In order to give relief to the Appellants, it would have to find that Article 
900(iv) was unconstitutional at the time of P’s death. If such a ruling had 
general retroactive effect, it could potentially throw into question the 
validity of the settlement of thousands of other estates that had been 
achieved during the interim. How the Court dealt with both of these issues 
is discussed in more detail below.   
iii. The Rationale  
On its face, the differing treatment accorded illegitimate children 
by Article 900(iv) would seem to present a prima facie case of 
discrimination based on “social status or family origin” in violation of 
Article 14(1).33 However, due to the central role of marriage in Japanese 
family law and the historical context described in Part IV.A.1, the 
provision survived for over half a century. In the 1995 Decision, the Court 
devoted several pages of text to explaining why Article 900(iv) did not 
violate the equal protection clause, as encapsulated in a summary 
paragraph: 
Since the Civil Code has adopted the system of marriage 
by law, the reason of enactment of the Provision has a 
reasonable ground. The fact that the Provision set out the 
statutory inheritance share of an illegitimate child at one-
half that of the legitimate child cannot be regarded as 
excessively unreasonable in relation to the reason of 
enactment, and exceeded the scope of reasonable 
discretion granted to the legislature. The Provision cannot 
                                                 
 
 
31 See id. pt. 3 (explaining the Court’s rationale for ruling counter to the 1995 
Decision). 
32 See id. pt. 4. 
33 See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14 (“All of the people 
are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic 
or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.”). 
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be regarded as an unreasonable discrimination and is 
against Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Constitution.34 
From an institutional perspective, for the Supreme Court the real 
challenge in the Inheritance Case would seem to have been how to 
overturn the 1995 Decision without simply declaring it to have been a 
mistake. This was in fact the view expounded by the five judges who 
dissented from that holding, as well as subsequent academic criticism.35 
Furthermore, the challenge is greater than it first appears. Although 18 
years separated the issuance of the two judgments, the Inheritance Case 
Court had to find Article 2001(iv) unconstitutional as of 2001 (when P 
died), a mere six years after the 1995 Decision was rendered. In the 
author’s view, it is hard to describe the Grand Bench as having risen to the 
challenge, but given these circumstances that is perhaps not unsurprising. 
As its starting point, the Court noted that in 1947 the Civil Code 
was amended to provide for an egalitarian system of inheritance in place 
of the pre-war system of katoku sōzoku under which a single heir 
(typically the eldest son) would inherit the status of head of household 
together with control of the household’s assets (see discussion at Part 
IV.A.1). 36  Nonetheless, a proviso from the pre-amendment code that 
accorded illegitimate children an unequal share in certain circumstances 
was incorporated into the new code. According to the Court, at the time 
these amendments were made the Japanese people had a discriminatory 
attitude towards children born out of wedlock.37 Furthermore, the Court 
noted that during the legislative process frequent reference had been made 
to various other countries of the world which at the time also had statutory 
provisions that discriminated against illegitimate children in matters of 
inheritance.38  
The Court also spent some time discussing social change, a theme 
that is central to its unconstitutionality ruling.39 Since the current Article 
900(iv) was enacted in 1947, Japan experienced rapid economic 
                                                 
 
 
34 1995 Decision, supra note 13 (summarizing the reasoning in the case). 
35 See, e.g., HIDEKI SHIBUTANI, KENPŌ [Japanese Constitutional Law] 199 (2007) 
(describing the majority opinion in the 1995 Case as “missing the mark” in 
focusing on the Civil Code family provisions being founded in legal marriage 
rather than the differing treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children).  
36 Inheritance Case, supra note 1. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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development and the decline of extended families. 40  Life expectancy 
increased, resulting in a greater need to provide for aging parents and 
spouses (reflected in a 1980 amendment to the Civil Code increasing the 
size of statutory share of a decedent’s estate accorded to surviving 
spouses).41 Japanese people started getting married later in life (or not at 
all) and had fewer children if they did.42 As a result, there had developed 
increasing diversity in the views of Japanese people regarding marriage 
and how families should be that has been accompanied by growth in the 
variety of family and marital structures.43  
The factual rationale – if it may be described in such terms – is 
actually hard to follow. The Court noted that the number of children born 
out of wedlock had decreased until the late 1970s, but has increased 
since.44 While asserting in one place that Japanese people have come to 
embrace different and more diverse attitudes towards marriage and family 
structures compared to days gone by, elsewhere the Court notes that 
unlike western countries, some in which births out of wedlock account for 
over 50% of all births, in Japan they accounted for only 2.2% in 2011.45 
The Court takes this as a sign that notwithstanding the diverse attitudes of 
Japanese towards family, the importance of legal marriage is still deeply 
rooted in the national consciousness46 – not so much change after all, it 
seems. 
The Court then turns its eyes again abroad, particularly to 
European nations (where religion was supposedly the reason for 
discrimination against the illegitimate) that had phased out legal 
distinctions between children based on legitimacy. Germany eliminated 
them in 1998 and France in 2001, leaving Japan one of the few countries 
in the world still having inheritance rules that discriminated against heirs 
born out of wedlock.47   
Also relevant was Japan’s ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1979 and the UN Convention on 
                                                 
 
 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See id. (noting that neither the United States nor European countries continue to 
distinguish between children born in or out of wedlock for inheritance as Japan 
does). 
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the Rights of the Child in 1994.48 Both instruments prohibit discrimination 
based on birth. The Court further explained that the respective UN 
committees overseeing these conventions had issued multiple 
recommendations that Japan eliminate the discriminatory provisions from 
its law, the most recent in 2010.49 This is noteworthy, since it has been 
observed that references by the Supreme Court to human rights 
instruments are rare (although the Court previously made such a reference 
in the Nationality Act Case discussed below).50 It is thus probably even 
more unusual for the Court to refer to criticism of Japan by UN human 
rights bodies as part of its rationale. This might be a sign of the Court 
being progressive, but could as easily be an indicator of a weak rationale 
being bolstered by whatever was at hand.   
The Court also drew on past litigation in related cases. It 
mentioned changes in regulations relating to the registration of children 
born out of wedlock as well as several lower cases challenging the 
discriminatory effect of such registration systems (cases that do not appear 
to merit mention in the Registration Case).51 The Court attached particular 
attention to the Grand Bench’s own 2008 decision in what is referred to in 
this article as the Nationality Act Case (discussed below) and which also 
involved a form of statutory discrimination related to birth status.52   
Legislative and regulatory history also features in the rationale of 
the Inheritance Case, but primarily in the form of descriptions of 
unsuccessful initiatives. According to the Court, various ministerial and 
legislative committees had been proposing amendments to Article 900 to 
remove the discriminatory provisions, the earliest in 1979, the most recent 
                                                 
 
 
48 See id. (referencing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171; Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 
1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38f0.html [hereinafter UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child]). 
49 Id. 
50 Lawrence Repeta, U.N. Committee Faults Japan Human Rights Performance, 
Demands Progress Report on Key Issues, ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL (May 17, 2009), 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lawrence-Repeta/3147. 
51 Inheritance Case, supra note 1. 
52 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand Bench) Jun. 4, 2008, 2006 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 
135, 62 SAIKŌ SAIIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] (Japan), 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/ 2008.06.04-2006.-Gyo-Tsu-
.No..135-111255.html [hereinafter Nationality Act Case]. 
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in 2010.53 Yet none of these initiatives ever advanced to the stage of being 
submitted to the Diet.54    
Yet for all the alleged social change, legal developments, and 
other factors given by the Court in explanation, the rationale of the 
decision remains unconvincing. It fails to come even close to identifying 
anything in the nature of a “tipping point” in Japanese social conditions 
between the 1995 Decision and the 2013 Inheritance Case. After all, much 
of the social change and diversification of attitudes cited by the Court 
were arguably well underway before 1995. Similarly, some of the 
legislative efforts and both of the international treaties discussed in the 
case predate the 1995 Decision.  
A tipping point would have been difficult to identify anyways, 
given that Petty Bench decisions subsequent to the 1995 Decision had 
reconfirmed the constitutionality of Article 900(iv), the most recent in 
2009 (referred to below as the “2009 Decision”). 55  The Court in the 
Inheritance Case judgment does refer to the 2009 Decision, but only 
references the dissenting and concurring opinions (discussed in subpart 
E.1 below), which support the Court’s conclusion in the Inheritance Case.  
Commendable as the Court’s holding regarding the 
unacceptability of discrimination between heirs based on their legitimacy 
may be, it nonetheless appears to have been arrived at through nothing 
more than a bundle of assertions leading to a pre-ordained conclusion. 
Ironically, the somewhat contorted rationale may be due to the 
comparatively low and amorphous standard of review the Court applied.  
C. Standards of Review 
                                                 
 
 
53 Inheritance Case, supra note 1. 
54 The use of legislative history even by the US Supreme Court is still a complex 
and sometimes controversial subject, particularly since the appointment to the 
Court of Justice Scalia, who has been openly critical of the use of legislative 
history as an interpretive tool. See, e.g. David Law & David Zaring, Law Versus 
Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1653, 1658-59 (2010). References to the history of legislative 
failures may not be as incongruous as they seem. As noted elsewhere in this 
article, constitutional claims are sometimes raised in the form of suits for 
damages against the state due to legislative nonfeasance by the Diet, as was the 
case in the Registration Case.  
55 See 2009 Decision, supra note 14; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (1st Petty Bench) 
Oct. 4, 2004, 1884 HANJI 40; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (1st Petty Bench) Mar. 
31, 2003, 1820 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 64; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (2nd Petty 
Bench) Mar. 28, 2003, 1820 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 62; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
(1st Petty Bench) Jan. 27, 2000, 1707 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 121.  
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Despite the clear wording of Article 14(1), all that is generally 
required for a statutory provision having discriminatory effect is for it to 
have a “rational basis” (gōritekina konkyo), a fairly low threshold that can 
be traced back to a 1964 Grand Bench decision that is also the starting 
point for the analysis in the Registration Case.56 Constitutional scholars 
have long argued that at least the categories specifically enumerated in 
Article 14(1) (race, creed, sex, social status and family origin) should 
enjoy a higher standard of judicial scrutiny when used as the basis for 
discriminatory treatment by law or government acts.57 The Supreme Court, 
however, has not attached any special significance to the enumerated 
categories and for most of its history has uniformly applied an extremely 
low standard of review in upholding discriminatory legislation of all types. 
For example, as described by Professor Craig Martin: “The Supreme 
Court of Japan has almost exclusively, until 2008, employed a 
rudimentary ‘rationality test’ similar to that initially developed in the early 
equal protection cases in the United States, and it has applied it 
universally in respect of all forms of discrimination.”58 
In other words, the standard of review in Japanese equal 
protection cases in Japan has long been comparable to the US “rational 
basis” standard, the lowest standard of review used by the Supreme Court. 
Since virtually all government activities are justified based on the public 
welfare and it is rare for governments to engage in blatantly irrational 
discrimination, this standard has resulted in most equal protection claims 
failing, though of course the same could be said for constitutional claims 
of any other type as well. In the family sphere, other discriminatory 
                                                 
 
 
56 Registration Case, supra note 3; see also Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand 
Brench) May 27, 1964, 18 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 676, 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/ js_20100319121321508675.pdf.  
57 See, e.g., SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN 176 (2011) 
(“[W]hile most academics have suggested the courts should distinguish between 
forms of discrimination and employ a more vigorous standard of review to 
discrimination based on the grounds enumerated in article 14, the Supreme Court 
has not shared this view. Rather, it has viewed discrimination based on these 
enumerated grounds merely as examples of unreasonable discrimination and has 
thus applied a very lenient standard of review to many forms of discrimination.”). 
58 Craig Martin, Glimmers of Hope: The Evolution of Equality Rights Doctrine in 
Japanese Courts from a Comparative Perspective, 20 DUKE J.COMP. INT’L L. 167, 
170 (2010).  
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provisions of the Civil Code have been upheld based on this rational basis 
standard.59 
This being the case, what may be surprising about equal 
protection jurisprudence in Japan is not that there have been so few 
successful challenges based on Article 14(1), but that there have been any 
at all. For many, the surprise is likely to be compounded by reading the 
very first instance in which the Japanese Supreme Court found a statute 
unconstitutional, a decision based on the finding of an Article 14(1) 
violation.  
The so-called “Patricide Case” of 1973 resulted in the Court 
invalidating provisions of the Penal Code that resulted in the punishment 
for homicide varying depending upon the relationship between the killer 
and the victim; persons who killed parents or other lineal ascendants were 
subject to more severe punishments than those who killed strangers or 
children or descendants.60 Although the Court was almost unanimous in 
finding the provision unconstitutional, there was a significant disparity of 
rationales as to why. As noted by Professor Martin, the Court never 
precisely identified the type of discrimination at issue in the case even 
though that would seem to be the crux of an equal protection case.61 The 
true significance of the Patricide Case is thus best sought in it being the 
first instance of the Supreme Court invalidating a statute and perhaps as a 
partial rejection of the feudally-rooted Confucian system of social 
ordering that had long prevailed in Japan.62  
                                                 
 
 
59 For example, the women-only six month waiting period for remarriage was 
upheld because it was intended to serve the rational goal of preventing the 
occurrence of conflicting presumptions about paternity. Law, supra note 18. 
60 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand Brench) Apr. 4, 1973, 1970(A) no. 1310, 27  
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 265, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1973.04.04-1970-A-
No.1310.html [hereinafter Patricide Case]; see Martin, supra note 58 at 200 
(discussing the Patricide Case). 
61 Martin, supra note 58 at 201. Note that as in the Inheritance Case, the Court in 
the Patricide Case also had to deal with a prior holding of the Court finding the 
provision at issue to be constitutional. See id. at 200 & n.98 (citing Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (1st Petty Bench) May 24, 1956, 10 Saikō Saibansho KEIII 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 734). Note also that the majority of Justices upheld the 
concept of the moral precepts about respecting elders being incorporated into law, 
finding the penal code provision to be unconstitutional not because the 
punishments for elder-slaying were harsher than for other types of homicide, but 
because they were disproportionately harsher. Id. at 201. 
62 See id. 
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Although the Patricide Case may offer little as an example of 
coherent Article 14(1) jurisprudence, three of the Court’s 
unconstitutionality rulings preceding the Inheritance Case were also made 
on equal protection grounds. However, two of these involved 
malapportionment in Diet seats. 63  Since those cases also implicated 
Article 44 of the Constitution, which enunciates a separate equal-
protection guarantee in connection with rights of political participation, 
they are best considered as applying a different standard than was 
applicable to the Inheritance Case.64 
The Nationality Act Case was the next instance of the Court 
invalidating a law based only on the equal protection guarantee in Article 
14. 65  The Nationality Act Case also involved statutory discrimination 
related to birth status. Specifically, the Nationality Act contained a 
provision that made children born out of wedlock to a Japanese father 
eligible for Japanese citizenship only if the Japanese father had 
                                                 
 
 
63 See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] (Grand Bench) July 17, 1985, 1984 (Gyo tsu) 
no. 339, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1100, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/ 1985.07.17-1984-Gyo-Tsu-
No.339.html [hereinafter Second Malapportionment Case]; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. 
Ct.] (Grand Bench) Apr. 14, 1976, 1974 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 75, 30 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 223 [hereinafter First Malapportionment Case].  
64 This characterization is an oversimplification intended to avoid being 
sidetracked by an extremely dense area of constitutional jurisprudence. As noted 
by one scholar, the fact that courts have treated the enumerated categories of 
prohibited discrimination in Article 44 the same as those in Article 14(1), that is, 
as a list of examples rather than categories subject to higher scrutiny, suggests 
that Article 44 does not establish a higher standard of review. Tomonobu Hayashi, 
Article 44 in SHINKIHONHŌ KOMENTARU – KENPŌ 319 (Hitoshi Serizawa, Masato 
Ichikawa, Shōjirō Sakaguchi eds., 2011). Prevailing academic theory holds that 
Article 44 should be construed as establishing a higher standard of review. Id. It 
could also be argued that the malapportionment cases can be further distinguished 
because voting rights also implicate the right to choose public officials under 
Article 15 and the basic principle of popular sovereignty supposedly underlying 
the entire Constitution and expressed in its Preamble and in Article 1. Academic 
theory aside, in its November 2013 rulings on malapportionment, the Grand 
Bench did not appear to attach any particular significance to Article 44, 
mentioning it once or twice as a relevant provision and then including it in 
subsequent references to “Article 14(1) etc. [tō].” Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
(Grand Bench), Nov. 20, 2013 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 226, available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/ english/judgments/text/2013.11.20-2013.-Gyo-Tsu-
.No..209%2C.210%2C.211.html (English translation).  
65 See Nationality Act Case, supra note 52. 
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acknowledged paternity before birth. 66  Even if a Japanese father 
acknowledged paternity after birth, a child born out of wedlock could only 
be eligible for Japanese nationality if the parents subsequently married.67 
The Grand Bench found this form of discrimination to be 
unconstitutional.68 
One of the reasons the Nationality Act accorded disparate 
treatment to children born out of wedlock depending upon when paternity 
was acknowledged was to prevent fraudulent acknowledgments being 
used for the purpose of conferring nationality.69 In theory, it would be 
possible for unscrupulous Japanese men to “sell” Japanese nationality to 
the children of foreigners by acknowledging paternity for a fee. In a world 
of simple rational basis scrutiny, this might have been enough for the 
provision to pass muster. In its opinion, the Court noted that preventing 
fraudulent acknowledgements of paternity was a rational policy goal, yet 
concluded there was not a rational connection between that goal and the 
distinction imposed by the law:  
[W]e should conclude that although the legislative 
purpose itself from which the Distinction is derived has a 
reasonable basis, reasonable relevance between the 
Distinction and the legislative purpose no longer exists 
due to the changes in social and other circumstances at 
home and abroad, and today, the provision of . . . the 
Nationality Act imposes an unreasonable and excessive 
requirement for acquiring Japanese nationality. Moreover, 
since the Distinction involves another distinction . . . we 
must say that it causes a child born out of wedlock who 
satisfies only the requirement of being acknowledged by a 
Japanese father after birth to suffer considerably 
disadvantageous discriminatory treatment in acquiring 
Japanese nationality, and even if we take into 
consideration the discretionary power vested in the 
legislative body when specifying requirements for 
acquisition of Japanese nationality, we can no longer find 
                                                 
 
 
66 Nationality Act, Act No. 147 of 1950, art. 3, para. 1 (Japan). 
67 Id. 
68 Nationality Act Case, supra note 52. 
69 See id. (“[I]f Japanese nationality is to be granted to a child by reason of 
acknowledgment by a Japanese father before legitimation takes place, fictitious 
acknowledgement is likely to occur in an attempt to acquire Japanese 
nationality.”). 
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any reasonable relevance between the consequence arising 
from the Distinction and the aforementioned legislative 
purpose.70 
The Court thus seemed to be applying a new standard of review in 
a discrimination case, one that despite continuing to be framed in terms of 
“rationality,” went further to look at the balance of interests at stake. As 
characterized by Professor Martin, the majority opinion contains all the 
elements of the framework of a Canadian-style “proportionality 
analysis”.71 For this reason, Martin characterizes the Nationality Act Case 
as a possible turning point, a “glimmer of hope” that the Court might be 
moving in the direction of a more nuanced and, perhaps more importantly, 
a higher standard of review in discrimination cases.72  
D. The Inheritance Case: Another Glimmer of Hope? 
Despite the new direction suggested by the Nationality Act Case, 
the 2013 Inheritance Case displays few signs of this higher standard being 
applied. Even using the rational basis standard, the Court had to articulate 
why a statutory provision that had been found to have a rational basis not 
only in 1995 but in 2009 as well no longer did. As discussed above, it is 
questionable whether the Court presented a convincing argument even 
with this low standard, so perhaps applying a higher standard would have 
required more specificity and, paradoxically, been more difficult. 
Yet perhaps the Court did not need to do more in this respect if its 
goal was to challenge a form of discrimination that most rational people 
would find difficult to justify, particularly since the discrimination is 
based on an attribute that victims have no control over – the marital status 
                                                 
 
 
70 Id. 
71 Martin, supra note 58, at 235. 
72 The Nationality Act Case is generally regarded as an example of “progressive” 
or “successful” judicial review in Japan and has been widely praised by Japanese 
and foreign scholars alike. While not objecting to the substantive result, the 
author actually found the case to be disturbing. Despite being a highly fractious 
judgment with a majority opinion, two separate dissenting opinions and several 
concurring opinions, the one point on which virtually all of the justices seemed to 
be able to agree was that “Japanese nationality… [is]an important legal status that 
means a lot to people in order to enjoy the guarantee of fundamental human rights, 
obtain public positions or receive public benefits in Japan.” Nationality Act Case, 
supra note 52 (emphasis added). Similar language to this taken from the majority 
opinion appears in the dissenting and concurring opinions as well. See id. What 
that language implies regarding the fundamental human rights of non-citizens in 
Japan is a subject that will have to be left for another day. 
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of their parents.73 If one assumes that the Court decided to overturn the 
1995 Decision first and developed the rationale later, the explanation 
given in the Inheritance Case may be as much as one can expect. 
The preceding is likely a very “American” view of the rationale 
given in the Inheritance Case. Constant disappointment with the lack of 
apparent depth of analysis is the likely fate of most American lawyers 
reading Japanese Supreme Court judgments. Starting with the deep 
continental roots in Japanese law and jurisprudence, there are some very 
basic differences in approach to constitutional cases between the courts of 
Japan and the United States, differences that have both been explained at 
great length elsewhere but that also render expectations of American-style 
analysis unrealistic.74 Still, it is hard to find a further “glimmer of hope” in 
the Inheritance Case, at least with respect to the manner in which the 
Court reached its conclusion.75  
E. Implementation 
i. The Significance 
Insofar as in the Inheritance Case the Supreme Court arrived at a 
decision that many people probably agree with, albeit a decade or two late, 
the rationale by which it did so may not be particularly important. 76 
                                                 
 
 
73 See 1995 Decision, supra note 13 (dissenting Toshijiro et al.) (“Discriminating 
by law against an illegitimate child, who is by no means responsible for the birth, 
on the ground of birth is in excess of the purpose of legislation [Article 900(iv)], 
i.e. the respect for and protection of marriage; there is no substantial relationship 
between the purpose of the law and the means of achieving it, and therefore, it 
cannot be found to be reasonable.”). 
74 See, for example, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1601 (2011), the entire issue of which 
is devoted to subjects discussed at a symposium on the subject of “Decision 
Making of the Japanese Supreme Court.” 
75 In part to draw attention to another difference between the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Japanese Supreme Court and constitutional courts such as the 
US Supreme Court, it should be noted that, due to timing, this article was written 
without the benefit of reference to the commentary typically published by the lead 
research judge who helped the Justices with researching and writing the opinion. 
See Masako Kamiya, “Chōsakan”: Research Judges Toiling at the Stone Fortress, 
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1601 (2011).  
76 Even significant Japanese Supreme Court cases seem to be fated to be reduced 
to a one or two sentence proposition, usually expressing a general principle, 
which is then reproduced in annotations and is what students have to remember in 
tests. The Supreme Court helps this process along by underlining those parts of its 
judgments that it considers particularly significant. With respect to the portion of 
the Inheritance Case describing the rational the Court used to arrive at is finding 
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However, from the standpoint of the evolution of the judicial power in 
Japan, the case may prove to be highly significant for a different reason: 
the manner in which it dealt with the tricky problem of the potential 
impact of its unconstitutionality ruling. 
To understand the significance of the Inheritance Case in this light, 
it may help to look more closely at the 2009 Decision – the most recent 
prior instance in which the Court had reaffirmed the constitutionality of 
Article 900(iv). Since the majority opinion merely followed the holding of 
the 1995 Decision, it did not need to do anything more than declare the 
provision to be constitutional and reject the appeal. A strong dissent by 
Justice Imai, who had also been on the court in the Nationality Act Case, 
argued that the Court should have applied the higher standard of review 
from the Nationality Act Case to find Article 900(iv) to be 
unconstitutional.77  
In the author’s opinion, however, the most instructive part of the 
2009 Decision is the concurrence of Justice Takeuchi Yukio, the only 
member of the Court who was still on the bench when the Inheritance 
Case was decided. Prophetically, Justice Takeuchi starts with the 
proposition that the majority opinion was only confirming that Article 
900(iv) did not lack a rational basis for Article 14(1) purposes as of the 
year 2000 (when the estate at issue went into probate), and that it was still 
possible for changes in social circumstances to render the provision 
unconstitutional in the future.78 This is the conclusion the Court reached a 
mere four years later in the 2013 Inheritance Case.79  
Despite concurring in the majority opinion, Justice Takeuchi 
nonetheless expressed the view that as of 2009, there was a “strong 
possibility” that the provision was now unconstitutional.80 However, he 
continued, nine years had passed since the estate at issue was probated, 
                                                                                                               
 
 
of unconstitutionality, the only part the Court deemed worth underling was the 
conclusion itself: “The provisions [Article 900(iv)] should be considered to 
contravene Article 14(1) at least by the time of July 2001.” See Inheritance Case, 
supra note 1 (underlining is absent in English translation). 
77 For a discussion of the 2009 Decision, see Martin, supra note 58, at 239-242. 
Professor Martin describes the 2009 Decision as appearing to run counter to the 
“glimmer of hope” presented by the Nationality Act Case. 
78 2009 Decision, supra note 14 (Takeuchi, J. concurring).  
79 Knowing this arguably renders the holding of the Inheritance Case even more 
incoherent, since in the 2009 Decision Justice Takeuchi is acknowledging that 
Article 900(iv) might still have a rational basis as of 2000, while in the 
Inheritance Case he and the rest of the Court find that it no longer does as of 2001. 
80 Id. 
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and if the Court were to declare Article 900(iv) to be void on 
constitutional grounds effective as of 2000, the validity of countless estate 
settlements during that period would be thrown into uncertainty. 81 
Additionally, cases might be reopened and the law would be thrown into 
confusion.   
ii. The Dilemma 
 This view that “the law is unconstitutional but if we invalidate it a 
lot of people would be inconvenienced” may well express the dilemma 
faced repeatedly by the Supreme Court in the development of its 
constitutional jurisprudence. Certainly this view has played a key role in 
the long succession of malapportionment cases.82 What should the Court 
do and what can the Court do are two very different questions and, in the 
author’s opinion, the Court’s resolutions can often be understood as an 
exercise in paying lip service to the former question while substantively 
addressing the latter. This is typically done in a way that is non-disruptive 
and involves essentially ratifying the status quo. In this sense, Justice 
Takeuchi’s concurrence in the 2009 Decision is noteworthy because it is 
unusual for the dilemma to be expressed so openly.  
Furthermore, “what if we issue a ruling but everyone ignores us” 
is likely a dilemma for constitutional courts everywhere, but perhaps 
particularly so for Japanese courts. This is suggested by the fact that 
within a few weeks of the historic ruling having been issued, the Justice 
System Committee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) initially 
refused to amend the Civil Code to remove the discriminatory provision 
from Article 900(iv).83 They subsequently relented and by the time this 
article was ready for publication an amendment to the Civil Code excising 
the discriminatory provision had been passed and taken effect.84  
Nonetheless, conservative LDP committee members were 
apparently unconvinced by the Grand Bench’s arguments about changing 
times and international treaty obligations. Some expressed concern that 
                                                 
 
 
81 Id. 
82 See supra note 64. 
83 Jimin hōmu bukai minpō kaiseian no ryōshō miokuri [LDP Legal Working 
Group Defers Approval of Proposed Amendment], NHK NEWSWEB (Oct. 29, 
2013), http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20131029/ k10015646411000.html 
(article has since been deleted by the news agency) (copy on file with author). 
84 Kyodo Jiji, Equal Inheritance Rights Now Law[,] but Illegitimate Birth 
Registries Stand, THE JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/ 2013/12/05/national/japan-enacts-bill-to-end-
discrimination-of-out-of-wedlock-children/#.U07rs_ldUdc.  
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changing the law would destroy the “traditional family system.”85 One 
parliamentarian went so far as to assert “if we change the law in 
accordance with this absurd [hijōshiki] Supreme Court decision, there will 
be more and more children born out of wedlock and the family system 
will collapse.”86 Granted, some of this may have been mere posturing for 
conservative voters. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that over two decades 
passed before the provisions found unconstitutional in the Patricide Case 
were removed from the Penal Code.87 
Whether the legislative branch respects the judgments of the 
judicial branch to the extent of reflecting them in statutes is a question that 
has obvious implications for the status of the Supreme Court and the 
judiciary as a whole. A similar question is raised by considering the 
possible effect on how the Court would be perceived if it issued a 
judgment that reopened countless disputes over inherited property that all 
the heirs involved thought had been settled. In a way, the issue of 
implementation and effect discussed by Justice Takeuchi in his 
concurrence in the 2009 Decision is one that goes to the heart of the 
Supreme Court’s judicial power.        
iii. The Solution 
 In the Inheritance Case, the Grand Bench confronted the issue of 
implementation head on. It did so by declaring that its finding that Article 
                                                 
 
 
85 See, e.g., Don’t Undermine the Inheritance Bill, THE JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 6, 
2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/11/06/editorials/dont-
undermine-inheritance-bill/#.Ut4_i7RUvIU (“Some lawmakers quoted in the 
media even suggested that they might defy the ruling by the nation’s top judicial 
authority if it appeared to conflict with their own values.”).  
86 LDP Legal Working Group Defers Approval of Proposed Amendment, supra 
note 83. Having spent a significant amount of time talking to Japanese people in 
various walks of law about family law issues, the author can attest that a common 
theme in many of these discussions (particularly with people in leadership 
positions) is the assertion that some sort of “traditional family values” exist, 
though they rarely seem to date further back than the Tokyo Olympics of 1964, 
the golden age of Japanese history, which Japanese baby-boomers seem to use as 
the gold-standard. In reality, “traditional” family values were much more 
complicated. Among other things, those who complain about children being born 
out of wedlock ignore the important role they have played in the most central of 
Japanese political institutions: the imperial household. Among other things, both 
the Meiji and Taisho emperors were born to concubines. 
87 During this period, the problem of subsequent constitutional challenges was 
avoided through the simple expedient of prosecutors never pressing charges under 
the offending provision. Regarding the legislative change to implement the 
Patricide Case, see SHIBUTANI, supra note 35, at 198-98.  
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900(iv) was void on constitutional grounds did not have any legal effect 
on any estates the settlement of which had already been conclusively 
settled during the period since P’s death. Structuring the effects of its 
judgments is a new thing for the Court. As noted in the concurrence of 
Justice Seishi Kanetsuki, there are no prior instances of the Court ruling in 
such a way regarding the binding nature of its own judgments. In principle 
a holding of unconstitutionality should have a general retroactive effect.88   
The Court has long had a practice of underlining what it considers 
to be the important parts of its rulings, presumably so lazy law students 
and annotators will be sure to remember and excerpt the correct parts.89 In 
the Inheritance Case two sections are underlined in this manner: (i) the 
comparatively short sentence declaring Article 900(iv) to be void on 
Article 14(1) grounds, and (ii) the longer sentence restricting the impact of 
the holding to the estate of P and other estates the settlement of which has 
not been concluded.90 A further indicator of the importance of the latter 
part of the ruling is suggested by the fact that two separate concurring 
opinions discussed its significance.91  
 This latter aspect of the case may prove to be far more significant 
in the development of the Court’s jurisprudence than the 
unconstitutionality ruling itself. By essentially empowering itself to 
structure unconstitutionality rulings that have only limited effect, the 
Court may be laying the groundwork for playing a more assertive role. 
Somewhat paradoxically, in the Japanese context it is likely easier for the 
Court to be assertive if it can do so without being overly disruptive. The 
decision could thus come to be seen as a milestone on the Court’s path to 
achieving greater recognition and acceptance in the eyes of Japanese 
people.  
Or perhaps it won’t. On that note let us turn now to the 
Registration Case, the judgment of which was rendered just a few weeks 
after that of the Inheritance Case.  
IV. THE REGISTRATION CASE 
F. Background 
                                                 
 
 
88 See Inheritance Case, supra note 1 (Kanetsuki, J. concurring). 
89 Although on its English website the Supreme Court provides translations of 
some of its judgments, this underlining is not replicated in the English versions.   
90 See id. (underlining is absent in English translation). 
91 See id. (Kanetsuki, J. concurring); id. (Chiba, J. concurring). 
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As a judgment, the Registration Case is simpler and shorter. 
However, particularly for the non-Japanese reader the contextual 
background required to understand it may be more complex. Indeed, the 
issue that was the crux of the case – the requirement that parents indicate 
whether a child is legitimate or not when reporting the birth to family 
register authorities – may be difficult to understand for Western readers 
unfamiliar with Japan’s system of family law. Indeed, the need to 
“register” a family may itself seem unusual not only to non-Japanese 
people but to at least some Japanese people as well. The challenge in the 
Registration Case was, after all, brought by a Japanese family. 
Accordingly, before discussing the case itself this article will take a 
contextual detour through the family register system and the current and 
past system of family law upon which it is based.  
iv. The Family Register and Family Law 
In Japan the family is tied to two registration systems, the family 
register (koseki) and the residence register (jūminkihondaichō). 92  Such 
registration systems have a long history in Japan, which had highly 
developed systems of household and tax registration as far back as the 
eighth century.93 Both systems were implicated in the Registration Case 
but the discussion that follows deal mainly with the family. 
As the name suggests, the family register is a registry of family 
units. Shortly after the Meiji Restoration Japan’s national government 
introduced a national system of family registers modeled on earlier 
systems that had been used on a regional basis.94 It was based on the 
system of extended families that prevailed at the time.95 However, these 
structures may be best thought of as “households” rather than families.96 
The traditional family unit that this system of registration system sought to 
                                                 
 
 
92 See generally KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947; JŪMIN 
KIHONDAICHŌHŌ [Basic Resident Register Act], Act No. 81 of 1967.  
93 See CARL STEENSTRUP, A HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 1868 44 (1991) 
(noting the existence of household registers and tax registers in discussing the 
Taika Administrative reforms of that period).  
94 KOSEKIHŌ [(Initial) Family Register Act], Ministerial Decree No. 170 of 1871, 
available at 
http://hourei.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/viewKaisei.do?i=yxoUt4k1zZocXPbcmtZE2Q
%3d%3d.  
95 See, e.g., STEENSTRUP, supra note 93, at 130-33 (discussing the ie system 
during the Tokugawa Period). 
96 The “ko” in koseki originally meant “house” rather than “family” (“seki” means 
“registration” or “document evidencing registration”) and is still used in Japanese 
when counting houses. 
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reflect was the “ie”, a Japanese term that also means “house” but might 
also be translated “extended family” or again “household”.  
The ieseido or “household system” was codified in the family law 
provisions of the Civil Code adopted in 1898, which defined the “house” 
as being comprised of such relatives of the head of the house as are in his 
house, and the husbands and wives of such relatives.97 A Family Register 
Act was passed at the same time in order to reflect the contents of this 
law.98  Although largely a system of record-keeping administration, the 
family register is inextricably tied to the Civil Code, which defines the 
types of relationships subject to registration.  
The traditional “household” system was inherently feudal and 
patriarchal in that it organized families around a koshu, or head of 
household. “Head of household” was a legally-recognized status generally 
accorded to the senior legitimate male member of the household. By law 
the head had had significant powers over junior members and family 
property.99 For example, a junior member could not choose a residence, 
                                                 
 
 
97 See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.], Act No. 9 of 1898, art. 732 [hereinafter Old 
Civil Code]; ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A 
PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK 111-120 (1976) (describing the old family law system 
and the significant amendments made to the provisions of Part IV during the post-
war American occupation). 
98 KOSEKIHŌ [(Old) Family Register Act], Act No. 12 of 1898, available at 
http://hourei.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/viewEnkaku.do?i=yxoUt4k1zZocXPbcmtZE2Q
%3d%3d [hereinafter Old Family Register Act]. This Family Register Act was 
completely modified again in 1914. KOSEKIHŌ [Revised (Old) Family Register 
Act], Act No. 26 of 1914, available at 
http://hourei.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/viewEnkaku.do?i=yxoUt4k1zZocXPbcmtZE2Q
%3d%3d.  
99See Old Civil Code, supra note 97, art. 748 (assigning all family property as 
property of the head of the household unless specifically acquired in the name of 
the junior member). As noted by Professor Michihiko Wada, the formal structure 
anticipated by the pre-war family system did not necessarily reflect the realities of 
family life: 
 A legal house was generally a group of persons comprising of three-to-
four generations, which could normally include several married couples with their 
children (or grandchildren), with one househead. In social reality, however, such 
members of a house did not necessarily live in the same place. Many, especially 
the second and younger sons with their families, lived and worked in cities as a 
result of industrialization, away from their rural (in many cases, farming) 
househeads, who no longer exercised any effective control over these members 
and their families.   
Mikihiko Wada, Abolition of the House (ie) Under the Occupation: Or the Two 
Faces of Koseki: A Janus, 26 LAW IN JAPAN 99, 108 (2000).  
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marry, or enter into an adoptive relationship against the will of the head of 
the household.100 The head also had duties, including the duty to support 
other members of the household.101 The head of household was also a 
heritable status, one that was transmitted not only upon the death of an 
existing head, but upon their formal retirement or loss of Japanese 
nationality.102 The rules of succession relating to this status essentially 
favored the oldest legitimate son of the prior head.103  
Although these rules no longer applied in postwar Japan, for 
purposes of understanding the historical background to the Registration 
Case it should also be noted that the old Civil Code also had specific rules 
dealing with children born out of wedlock. If the father acknowledged 
paternity the child could enter the household as a shoshi (an 
acknowledged illegitimate child whose status within the household was 
legally inferior to that of legitimate children), but only with the consent of 
the head.104 Otherwise such children entered the mother’s household.105  
It is important to understand that the ie system was also part of a 
system of public administration, since it allowed the government to 
implement policy through the head of the household. 106  The family 
register facilitated (and still facilitates) this governance system by both 
serving as a source of information about families and an instrument for 
administrative intervention in them. 107  Under the ie system the family 
register system would identify the head of a household and thus allow the 
government to know who was responsible for the household’s members 
and property.  
The koseki system initially established in 1872 was used to 
implement basic government functions such as taxation and 
conscription.108 Although the initial register system was public, its utility 
                                                 
 
 
100 Id. arts. 749-50.  
101 Id. art. 747. See also id. arts. 954-63 (setting forth more detailed rules as to the 
duties of support that existed within the household unit).  
102 Id. arts. 964-85. See also id. art. 752 (prohibiting the head of household from 
resigning this status unless he reached the age of sixty, at which point he could 
formally transfer the status to the next in line, typically the eldest legitimate son).  
103 Id. art. 970.  
104 Id. arts. 735, 827-36.  
105 Id. art. 735.  
106 OPPLER, supra note 97, at 120.  
107 Wada, supra note 99, at 106-08; MIKIHIKO WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI [The 
Abolition of the Ie System] 214 (2010).  
108 See WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 418 (acknowledging the 
family register’s easily overlooked value as a source of statistical information 
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in commerce led to a person’s family register details being a matter of 
public record, since it could be used to confirm creditworthiness. Given 
the nature of the ie system, the head of the household or his eldest 
legitimate son would be far better credit risks than any other member since 
they would either have or could be expected to inherit the power to 
dispose of the household’s property. Its status as a public record remained 
a feature of the family register system until increased concerns over the 
protection of privacy led to 1976 amendments that limited access 
generally to members of the applicable family.109     
While the above description is largely of historical interest, it is 
important to understand that from its inception in the system described 
above, the family register system in Japan still exists primarily to define a 
limited range of legally significant family relationships or statuses for 
purposes of interactions with the rest of society and the government. 
Though not a perfect analogy, it may be helpful for western readers to 
think of the family registry as something akin to a real estate title registry, 
which enables government agencies and potential purchasers or 
mortgagors to confirm the legal status of a particular piece of land.110 The 
family register is no longer a public document, but its role as part of a 
system of governance remains, even today. And although the ie system is 
also now a matter of historical interest, as we shall see it has cast a long 
shadow over both family attitudes and the way the family register system 
operates in 21st century Japan. 
                                                                                                               
 
 
about families); Shūhei Ninomiya, Kojinjōhō no hogo to koseki kōkai gensoku no 
kentō [The Protection of Personal Information and the Public Family Register 
Principle], 304 RITSUMEI HŌGAKU 238, 240 (2006) (characterizing the first 
national family register system established in 1871 primarily as a means of 
implementing taxation, conscription and peacekeeping rather than a system of 
identification). 
109 Id. at 239. But see KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 
10-2 (maintaining even today a wide range of exceptions to the privacy of family 
register information, including for lawyers and other licensed professionals 
requiring such information in connection with legal cases). 
110 For example, under Articles 818 and 819 of the present Civil Code, parental 
authority is exercised (i) by both parents during marriage, (ii) by the mother if the 
child is born out of marriage and (iii) only by one parent after divorce, either by 
agreement or judicial determination. See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] arts. 818-19. 
Since marriage and divorce are reflected in the family register, who is entitled to 
exercise parental authority on behalf of a particular (Japanese) child can be 
ascertained merely by looking at the family register (or an official extract), 
obviating the need to submit custody decrees or separation agreements as is often 
the case in the United States, for example.   
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The story of the creation of the current Japanese Constitution and 
the complex demands, interactions and compromises between American 
occupiers and Japanese government actors has been told in great detail 
elsewhere.111 The part of the story relevant to this article is the American 
insistence on the inclusion of Article 24, which had profound implications 
on the system of family law just described. Article 24 reads: 
Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of 
both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual 
cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a 
basis. 
With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, 
inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters 
pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be 
enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the 
essential equality of the sexes.112   
Historical analysis of the process by which the Constitution was 
adopted suggests that when the Diet approved the Constitution containing 
this provision there were differing views as to what it meant for the ie 
system. Some legislators apparently believed the system could be retained, 
while others thought the new Constitution mandated abolition of the ie 
system.113 Additionally, some Japanese scholars in the drafting committee, 
such as Takeyoshi Kawashima, saw this as an opportunity to amend a 
system of family law they already considered outdated and moribund.114  
                                                 
 
 
111 See, e.g., RAY A. MOORE & DONALD R. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR 
DEMOCRACY: CREATING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR (2002).  
112 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 24. This is not the exact 
provision originally proposed by the American drafters. During the course of its 
drafting and approval by the Diet various changes were made to Article 24, but 
the Americans were insistent upon the inclusion of the concepts of gender 
equality and respect for individual freedom. See, e.g., Moore & Robinson, supra 
note 109 at 131.  
113 The views of the various participants in the process of drafting and adopting 
Article 24 and revising the Civil Code are discussed in great detail in WADA, 
IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 25-166. 
114 WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 25-166. Oppler similarly 
describes the old family system as “moribund even without the pressures 
accompanying the making of the Constitution: it would only have died a slower 
death.” OPPLER, supra note 97, at 115.  
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For their part, to the extent the Americans thought about family 
law their principal concerns were with gender equality and elimination of 
the “head of household.” This institution was inconsistent with principles 
of equality and also was regarded as a component of the Japanese feudal 
system, the dismantling of which was a core objective of the 
occupation.115 Beyond elimination of the head of the household system, 
the Americans did not initially press for the elimination of the ie system 
itself, leaving the details of reform up to the Japanese, though free of 
course to veto anything they disliked.  
Thus it fell to the Japanese scholars and officials charged with 
amending the Civil Code to ensure the Code’s consistency with the 
egalitarian new Constitution.116 Amendments to the Family Register Act 
would naturally spring from these changes, though this was complicated 
by a factor to be discussed shortly.  
Some of the Japanese participants advocated the complete 
elimination of the ie system, while others insisted it be retained in some 
form even if only as a set of moral precepts.117 While some American 
officials expressed the “private” view that elimination was desirable, it 
was decided that completely eliminating the ie system from the Civil Code 
would likely to trigger the veto powers implicitly retained by the 
occupiers over the drafting process. 118  To assuage the conservative 
members of the Japanese committee, a minor form of conspiracy was 
proposed: the drafters would retain enough elements of the ie system in 
the new laws so that it could be revived after the occupation if desirable.119 
                                                 
 
 
115 Id. at 94, 107, 131 (including on page 94 the full text of the Supreme 
Commander Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur’s memo setting forth 
guidelines for the new Constitution, one of which was “the feudal system of Japan 
will cease.”); see also OPPLER, supra note 97, at 116-17 (regarding family law 
reform).  
116 OPPLER, supra note 97, at 116-17 (“While we never urged the complete 
abolition of the house system, we watched with interest how the Japanese would 
adjust it to the principles of the [c]onstitution. They did a more thorough job than 
we had expected.”) (citation omitted).  
117 WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 133-45. 
118 Id.  
119 This compromise is also reflected in Article 730 of the current Civil Code 
which contains a vague statement about relatives having to help each other. See 
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 730. This provision is understood by scholars to 
have no legal effect, having been inserted as a sop to the people who objected to 
the elimination of the ie system and its defined duties of support among family 
members. See, e.g., Yoshiro Miyazaki, Dai 730 Jō [Article 730], in HANREI 
MINPŌ 9 – SHINZOKU [CIVIL CODE ANNOTATED WITH PRECEDENTS, VOL. 9 – 
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The primary vehicle for doing this was to be the Family Register Act, 
which was amended so that it was based not on individuals (which 
arguably would have been more consistent with Article 24 of the 
Constitution) but primarily on marriages and surnames.120  
The continuing significance of surnames in Japanese family law – 
Article 750 of the Civil Code still contains the anachronistic requirement 
that one spouse adopt the other’s surname upon marriage 121  – can be 
understood in this context. Under the pre-war Civil Code, members of a 
household all bore the same family surname.122 The surname was thus 
considered a possible replacement, or a foundation on which to rebuild the 
ie system, though that ultimately did not happen.123  
A surprising amount of debate thus went into the Family Register 
Act amendments that followed the Civil Code amendments, since it was in 
the latter act that some remnants of the ie system could be preserved, even 
though the register system was originally intended as an administrative 
tool rather than a locus of substantive family law. 124  Furthermore, the 
American participants in the process were quick to appreciate the intent 
behind the initial drafts. Having not insisted on eradicating the ie system 
from the Civil Code, once the decision had been made to do so the 
Americans overseeing the process objected strongly to efforts to keep 
elements of it alive through the family register system. 
For example, Oppler and his colleagues successfully blocked 
early draft amendments to the Family Register Act on the grounds that 
certain features, such as provisions that would allow three generations to 
be registered as a single family in certain circumstances, were reminiscent 
                                                                                                               
 
 
RELATIVES] 8-9 (Yoshihisa Nomi & Shintaro Kato eds., 2d. ed. 2009). A remnant 
of the ie system can also be seen in Article 897 which creates an exception to the 
general egalitarian rules of inheritance for “rights to ownership of a genealogy, 
equipment used in rituals, and any grave“, which pass according to “who custom 
dictates shall preside over rituals for ancestors” or testamentary designation. 
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 897, para. 1. 
120 Note that some of the participants in the process advocated a registration 
system based solely on individuals. WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107 at 
292-297. 
121 See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 750. 
122 Old Civil Code, supra note 97, art. 746.  
123 Wada, supra note 99, at 118-120. 
124 This doubtless explains why Article 6 of the Family Register Act requires a 
family register to be organized around married couples and “children thereof with 
the same surname” or an unmarried parent and “children thereof with the same 
surname.” See KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 6. 
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of the old ie system. 125  The Americans also pushed the Japanese to 
consider a system of registration based on individuals rather than 
families.126 The Japanese succeeded in resisting this demand, in part by 
arguing about how much extra work and recordkeeping would be required 
to do so.127  
In fact, the accounts of the negotiations between the American 
and Japanese sides over the Family Register Act are an example of the 
clash of American-style individualism and the Japanese family-based 
collectivism. The resulting system that remains in force today is a 
compromise, a system of registering families based on a two-generation 
nuclear family that would have been familiar to Americans. Yet, at the 
same time, it was not a system based on individuals. For this reason, it is 
also a system in which the matter of whether a child is born in or out of 
wedlock is of fundamental importance. Children born to a married couple 
are registered in the new register created at the time of the marriage and 
share the couple’s surname.128 Children born out of wedlock are registered 
in a new family register created for the mother and share her surname.129        
The ie system was never revived, but the family register system, 
which reflected at least the hope that it might be, remains in place. And 
while many Japanese people themselves may find the system difficult to 
rationalize, it should be remembered that its original purpose was to be a 
means by which the government could gather information about the 
population and, particularly in the past, use as a means of control.130 More 
                                                 
 
 
125 WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 287-332. 
126 See OPPLER, supra note 97, at 11214.   
127 WADA, IESEIDO NO HAISHI, supra note 107, at 295.  
128 KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 18. 
129 MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 790. An unmarried woman would typically 
remain registered in her parents’ register until marriage. However if she has a 
child the Family Register Act requires a new register to be prepared for her and 
the child, as in accordance with the occupation-era objections to a system 
allowing for registrations spanning three generations. See KOSEKIHŌ [Family 
Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 17. A child born out of wedlock may 
only take the father’s surname through the intervention of a family court. MINPŌ 
[MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 791, para. 1.   
130 Needless to say, the registration system only works if events are registered. For 
those events that are voluntarily, registration is fostered by registration being a 
prerequisite to legal effect. Thus a marriage or divorce only takes legal effect 
upon registration. MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 739, para. 1. Similarly, the birth 
of a child must be registered within two weeks (or three months, in the case of 
children born to Japanese parents abroad). See KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], 
Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 49. Note that among other things, the family registration 
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prosaically, the family register – usually in the form of official 
documentary extracts that can be obtained from the local government 
administering it – is a basic form of identification in Japan.131 Whereas 
westerners are likely to prove identity and family status through a 
combination of documents that confirm specific events (births, marriages, 
divorces, custody decrees, deaths), in Japan an extract of a person’s family 
register provides a current (and thus more accurate) snapshot of a person’s 
family status (the legally-significant aspects of it, at least).  
This is the historical and legal context in which the Registration 
Case arose. While it may appear to be a dispute over a seemingly 
anachronistic and pointless documentary requirement in a government 
form, it actually goes to the heart of a system of family law in which 
marriage and legitimacy are central to the entire design of the system, a 
design which itself reflects the remnants of a very different set of family 
traditions.     
v. The Facts of the Registration Case 
According to the recitation of the facts in the Supreme Court’s 
judgment, two of the appellants were a man and woman who began living 
together in 1999 in Tokyo.132 They were not legally married. In 2005, the 
woman gave birth to a child (also named as an appellant).133 The man had 
filed an acknowledgement of paternity before the birth.134 The case arose 
                                                                                                               
 
 
system makes it possible for the registry authorities to confirm that the marriage 
does not violate any of the prohibitions specified in the Civil Code (e.g. bigamy, 
incestuous marriages, marriages by minors, etc.). See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] 
art. 740 (referencing prohibitions contained in Articles 731-737 and 739). 
Furthermore, because even changes in family status resulting from court decrees 
(divorce, allocation of parental authority) are reflected in the family register by 
filing the decree, there is rarely any need to produce a divorce or custody decree 
in day-to-day life in Japan. 
131 Indeed, family registers are even proof of Japanese nationality, since only 
Japanese people have a family register. The treatment of a Japanese person who 
marries a foreign national is essentially the same as one who has a child out of 
wedlock; a new register is created for the Japanese person (unless they have 
already established their own register). See KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act 
No. 224 of 1947, art. 16, para. 3. As a result, in addition to discriminating based 
on legitimacy almost out of necessity, at a basic level the Japanese system of 
family law also discriminates based on nationality. 
132 Registration Case, supra note 3. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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when he tried to register the birth with the family register authorities.135 
The form used to report births requires several items of information that 
seem both incongruous and invasive of privacy. One is whether the child 
was born in or out of wedlock.136  
The father of the child sought to register the birth as required by 
law without filling in the “in/out of wedlock” part of the form.137 The 
registry authority rejected the filing as defective.138 Without the household 
registry filing being accepted, the parents were also unable to create a 
residence registry for the child.139 The two sides spent a number of years 
in an impasse, until 2010 when the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) sent a 
directive to registry authorities around the nation essentially directing 
them to seek a compromise with parents in this situation by asking them to 
file a notice of birth that, while not filling in the “in/out-of wedlock” part 
of the form, would allow the authorities to register the necessary details.140 
If the parents did not respond then the authorities could confirm the 
necessary details themselves, since the marital status of the parents would 
already be apparent from their household registers.  
G. The Case 
                                                 
 
 
135 See Registration Case, supra note 3. Although not mentioned in the case, 
another way in which the Family Register Act discriminates based on legitimacy 
is by requiring that notifications of births of children born out of wedlock be filed 
by the mother unless she is unable to do so, in which case the filing can be made 
by a cohabitant, attending doctor or midwife, or legal representative. See 
KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, art. 52. Notifications of 
birth to a married couple may be filed by either the father or mother. See id. 
Accordingly, the father in the Registration Case was presumably able to file 
because he was cohabitating with the mother.   
136 Registration Case, supra note 3; KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 
224 of 1947, art. 49(2)(i). 
137 Registration Case, supra note 3. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. One of the interesting things about Japanese family law is that a certain part 
of it is shaped not by court rulings, but by MOJ guidance and directives addressed 
to local registry authorities as to how to deal with the registration in situations 
where the law is unclear or special circumstances apply. This is authorized by 
provisions of the Family Registry Act. See KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act 
No. 224 of 1947, art. 3. These provisions of the Family Register Act are also 
noteworthy because they essentially subjugate the democratically-elected heads of 
local governments to the instructions of unelected Ministry of Justice bureaucrats 
with respect to administration of the family register.    
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The parents brought suit in 2011 asserting two claims for damages 
under Article 1(1) of the State Redress Act.141  One was based on the 
alleged tortious legislative nonfeasance on the part of the national 
government for failing to eliminate the discriminatory provision of the 
Household Registration Act. 142  The other asserted administrative 
nonfeasance on the part of the authorities administering the residence 
registration for failing to register the child in the residence registry.143 
Both claims were based on the argument that requiring a notation as to 
legitimacy was a form of unreasonable discrimination in violation of 
Article 14(1). 144  Other relief had also been sought in the lower court 
proceedings (including a declaratory judgment to the effect that the 
municipal authorities were obligated to register the child in the residence 
                                                 
 
 
141 Registration Case, supra note 3. The State Redress Act implements Article 17 
of the Japanese Constitution under which the people are entitled to sue the state 
for redress. See KOKKA BAISHŌ HŌ [State Redress Act], Act No. 125 of 1947. 
Article 1(1) of the Act reads: “When a public officer who exercises the public 
authority of the State or of a public entity has, in the course of his/her duties, 
unlawfully inflicted damage on another person intentionally or negligently, the 
State or public entity shall assume the responsibility to compensate therefor.” Id. 
art. 1, para 1. 
142 Registration Case, supra note 3. Although the Court did not directly address 
the claim, a brief explanation of “legislative nonfeasance” is probably necessary, 
since it is a claim that is not used as a basis for constitutional claims in the United 
States. As the term suggests, a claim based on legislative nonfeasance involves an 
assertion that the legislature has a constitutional obligation to enact or amend laws 
necessary to address a constitutional deficiency in an existing program or give 
effect to one or more provisions of the Constitution (some of which, such as the 
Article 13 right to the pursuit of happiness or the Article 25 right to a minimum 
standard of cultured living, are considered to be so abstract as to be non-
justiciable without further legislative definition). Since the Supreme Court defers 
greatly to the discretion of the Diet such claims are rarely successful. However, 
the concept of legislative nonfeasance did play a role in the reasoning of the Court 
in the 2005 Overseas Voting Case, in which the Grand Bench found that the 
failure of the Diet to make adequate provisions enabling equal participation by 
overseas voters in Diet elections was unconstitutional. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
(Grand Bench) Sep. 14, 2005, 2001 (Gyo tsu) no. 82, 59 SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2087, available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.09.14-2001.-Gyo-Tsu-
.No..82%2C.2001.-Gyo-Hi-.No..76%2C.2001.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..83%2C.2001.-Gyo-
Hi-.No..77.html (English translation). 
143 Registration Case, supra note 3. 
144 Id. 
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registry), but these had been retracted by the time of the appeal to the 
Supreme Court.145  
 The Court rejected the Article 14 argument, noting that the 
registration of the birth and notation of legitimacy did not result in a legal 
distinction between children born in and out of wedlock; these were 
established by the Civil Code.146 The Court then explained how the family 
structures established by the Civil Code were founded in legal (registered) 
marriage, with children necessarily being treated differently depending 
upon whether their parents are married, including whose surname they 
bear,147 and how they are registered in the first place.148 Accordingly, it 
could not be said that the information requirements of the birth 
registration form alone resulted in discriminatory treatment of children 
born out of wedlock.  
The Court acknowledged that the registration authorities could 
use the information already in their possession to confirm whether a child 
was born in or out of wedlock, but accepted that requiring parents to fill in 
the information nonetheless served the rational goal of furthering 
administrative convenience. 149  As to any concerns about privacy, the 
Court asserted that the reported information about birth status was subject 
to strict privacy protections and could not be easily accessed by third 
parties, implying that birth status was unlikely to be a source of 
discrimination from other parties.150 Finally, the Court refused to entertain 
the argument that the notation “out of wedlock” (chakushutsu de nai ko) 
as used in the reporting document was itself discriminatory, since it was 
                                                 
 
 
145 Id. Among other things, after reminders from the authorities had no effect, the 
authorities made the necessary registrations without the cooperation of the parents, 
as was permitted under Articles 24 and 44 of the Family Register Act. Id.; see 
also KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947, arts. 24, 44.  
146 Registration Case, supra note 3. 
147 Id. Article 790 of the Civil Code states:  
(1) A child in wedlock shall take the surname of his/her parents; provided that if 
the parents divorce before the child is born, the child shall take the surname of 
his/her parents at the time of divorce. 
(2) A child out of wedlock shall take the surname of his/her mother. 
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [Civ. C.] art. 790. 
148 Registration Case, supra note 3. See KOSEKIHŌ [Family Register Act], Act No. 
224 of 1947, arts. 6, 18 (detailing how children are to be registered). 
149 Registration Case, supra note 3. 
150 Id.  
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used in the Civil Code, the Family Register Act and other laws and 
regulations.151 
 This was the final claim addressed by the Court before it rejected 
the Article 14(1) argument. The Court found that Article 49(2) of the 
Family Register Act, which required notation of legitimacy in birth reports, 
did not establish unreasonable discrimination between legitimate and 
illegitimate children.152 The only part of the judgment that is underlined is 
the statement that “the Provision cannot be regarded as setting down 
discriminatory treatment against a child born out of wedlock as compared 
to a child born in wedlock and therefore it is not in violation of Article 14 
paragraph (1) of the Constitution.”153 The Court declined to address the 
appellants’ other unspecified constitutional claims.154  
 In a short concurring opinion, Justice Sakurai Ryūko agreed with 
the conclusions of the Court but made a point of criticizing a system that 
had allowed a Japanese child to go for over seven years without being 
recorded in either a family register or a residence register, thereby 
possibly suffering various disadvantages through no fault of his or her 
own.155 She questioned whether it was really necessary to impose such 
disadvantages on children, given that the registry officials could make the 
necessary notations relevant to legitimacy based on the information 
available without self-reporting by parents.156  
H. So Much for Social Change 
Although the Registration Case was heard by a Petty Bench, all of 
the judges who participated had also been part of the same Grand Bench 
                                                 
 
 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 See id. (Sakurai, J. concurring). One of the disappointing aspects of both the 
Inheritance Case and the Registration Case is how little the interests of children – 
as opposed to the doctrinal purity of Japan’s marriage-centric system of law – 
seem to factor into the respective conclusions. As already noted, Japan is a party 
to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3 of which mandates 
that inter alia that “best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration” in 
“all actions concerning children” by courts and other government institutions. UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 48, art. 3. While the 
Inheritance Case references the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, it 
seems to do so more as a source of ammunition to support its conclusion rather 
than as part of a reasoned consideration of how different conclusions would affect 
children in the real world.  
156 Registration Case, supra note 3. 
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that decided the Inheritance Case just three weeks previously. Had there 
been more time between the two cases, the language of the Inheritance 
Case would likely have featured in the appellant’s briefs in the 
Registration Case. And yet none of the social change, new attitudes about 
marriage, increasing family diversity, international treaties proscribing 
discrimination based on birth status, or legislative initiatives that had 
seemed so important to the Court in the Inheritance Case merited any 
comment whatsoever in the Registration Case. While the Inheritance Case 
was specifically about inheritance, there was nothing about the Court’s 
rationale that inherently limited it to that area of law. Indeed, the Court 
addressed the case primarily within the context of supposedly greatly 
changed attitudes about marriage and family.  
V. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION 
How could the same court arrive at such seemingly incongruous 
results in the same month? Unlike the historic Inheritance Case, the 
holding in the Registration Case seems like business as usual for Japan’s 
“conservative” Supreme Court.157 Yet viewed from the standpoint of the 
Court acting in an institutionally rational manner in the exercise and 
development of the judicial power, the two cases may not be as 
inconsistent as they seem. 
The Inheritance Case was based on a strong sentiment that existed 
within the Court regarding the discrimination in Article 900(iv), a 
sentiment already evident in the 1995 Decision through the five justices 
who dissented. 158  This view was probably strengthened as much by 
criticism of constitutional scholars and subsequent concurrences and 
dissents as it was by “social change.” Furthermore, once the Court dealt 
with the implementation problem by limiting the scope of its ruling, it 
could naturally expect that lower courts hearing any new inheritance 
disputes between legitimate and illegitimate heirs would follow its 
interpretation in ignoring the discrimination in 900(iv), even if the Diet 
failed to amend the Civil Code in response to its ruling. 
In contrast, if the Court had declared the legitimacy designation at 
issue in the Registration Case unconstitutional, the Court would by 
implication call into question the entire foundation of Japanese family law, 
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reflected in a number of provisions of the Civil Code, not just a discrete 
rule of inheritance.   
Furthermore, if the Court had declared the registration 
requirement void, it would be interfering with a system administered by 
the Ministry of Justice, which might have been more significant than 
Article 900(iv).159 As noted in the Court’s discussion of legislative history, 
the MOJ had long been involved in unsuccessful efforts to amend the 
provision referenced in the Inheritance Case, meaning the ruling would 
not likely conflict with MOJ initiatives.  
As for the registration requirement, it merits note that apparently 
spurred by the refutation of legitimacy-based discrimination in the 
Inheritance Case, on October 1, 2013 Akashi City in Hyogo introduced a 
birth report form that did not require parents to indicate such status.160 
They were immediately struck down by both MOJ officials and Sadakazu 
Taniguchi, the Minister of Justice himself, who reportedly asserted that 
the law did not permit local governments to create their own forms.161 It 
would be the MOJ,162 not elected local governments or even the Supreme 
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was implemented, the entire judiciary was essentially subordinated to the MOJ, 
which exercised control over judicial personnel. Certain seats on the Supreme 
Court are informally reserved for former prosecutors, the elite members of the 
legal profession who control the MOJ. See Lawrence Repeta, Reserved Seats on 
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160 Hyōgoken Akashishi ga chakushutushi no kisai sakujo shussetodoke de 
zenkoku hatsu [Aakashi city in Hyogo Prefecture is first in nation with birth 
report without indication of legitimacy], KYOTO SHINBUN, (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://www.kyoto-np.co.jp/country/article/20131001000146. Apparently, 
therefore, the “administrative convenience” referenced by the Registration Case 
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161 Chakushutsushi ran sakujo no shusse todoke, Akashi ga tōmen kōfu chūshi 
[Akashi City to Suspend Issuance of Birth Reports without Legitimacy Column], 
KOBE SHINBUN, (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.kobe-
np.co.jp/news/shakai/201310/0006394131.shtml.   
162 And the Diet, of course. At the same time amendments to the Civil Code to 
bring it into line with the Inheritance Case were passed in the Diet, a proposed 
amendment to eliminate the legitimacy designation in the Family Register was 
rejected. See Kongaishi kitei sakujo wo kaketsu shuin hōmui kosekihō kaisei de ha 
irei no jikō bunretsu [House of Representatives Legal Affairs Committee 
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Court exercising the judicial power, that would decide how the family 
register system would be administered. 
Given the context of the Inheritance Case, the Supreme Court’s 
expansion of the judicial power in that case would likely be acceptable to 
most stakeholders (including the general public). The Registration Case 
showed the same Court being equally pragmatic. Even if the Justices had 
secretly wished to invalidate the registration requirement, doing so would 
have only drawn attention to the discriminatory foundations of the 
nation’s family law but done nothing to remedy them. This would have 
also disrupted the governance of a nationwide registration system 
administered by a Ministry having a particularly complex relationship 
with the judiciary. The Court trumpeted social change and changing 
attitudes in the first case, while ignoring these considerations in the second. 
This suggests a certain cynicism involved in the resolution of both cases, 
although this conclusion could just be a reflection of the author’s own 
cynicism. 
In any case, the Court’s use of the Inheritance Case to hone its 
power of constitutional review into a more precise tool may ultimately 
make it possible for the Court to turn to some of the other inequalities that 
remain deeply rooted in Japanese family law. That in turn would surely 
further enhance the Court’s own legitimacy in the eyes of the Japanese 
people. 
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